SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B-296
Author: Schlag, Karl H.
Title: Why Imitate, and
if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution
Abstract: In
consectutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is
randomly matched, obtains a payoff and then observes the performance of
another agent. An agent determines future behavior based on the information
she receives from the present round. She chooses among the behavioral rules
that increase expected payoffs in any specifications of the matching
scenario. The rule that outperforms all other such rules specifies to
imitate the action of an agent that performed better with probability
proportional to how much better she performed. The evolution of a large
population in which each agent uses this rule can be approximated in the
short run by the replicator dynamics.
Keyword: Random matching, learning, imitation, replicator
dynamics
JEL-Classification-Number: C79
Creation-Date:
November 1994
URL:
../1994/b/bonnsfb296.pdf
SFB 303 Homepage
17.02.1998, © Webmaster