SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B - 292
Author: Selten, Reinhard
Title: Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation
Abstract: The paper presents an expository account of several experimentally
based descriptive theories of cooperation in interactive decision
situations. First the equity principle (Selten 1988), prominence in the
decimal system (Albers and Albers 1983), and the difference measure of
predictive success (Selten 1991) are explained. Then the theory of equal
division payoff bounds (Selten 1987) for zero-normalized three-person games
in characteristic function form is presented and its predictive success is
compared to that of the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler 1964) and its
modifications (Maschler 1978). The theory of the negotiation agreement area
(Kuon and Uhlich 1993) for two-person characteristic function games with
non-zero one-person coalition values is described and discussed with respect
to its predictive success. The aspiration balance principle (Tietz and Weber
1972) and its dynamic elaborations, the planning difference theory and the
dynamic balance aspiration theory (Tietz 1975, 1976) are explained and
examined with respect to empirical support. The next topic is the empirical
relevance of the minimal core for cooperatively played 3x3x3-games (Ostmann
1988) Finally, results of a strategy study on a repeated asymmetric Cournot
duopoly (Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich 1988) are described and the
structure of typical strategies programmed by subjects is discussed. This
structure involves a cooperative goal and its active pursuit by what is
called a measure-for-measure policy.
Keywords: Cooperation, descriptive theories, game experiments
JEL-Classification-Number: C71, C72, C91, C92
Creation-Date: August 1994
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