SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B-181

Author: Mitzkewitz, Michael, and Rosemarie Nagel
Title: Envy, Greed, and Anticipation in Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study
Abstract: This paper is about experiments on two versions of ultimatum games with incomplete information, called the offer games and the demand games. Game theory predicts for both versions very similar outcomes. Our experiments, however, show significant differences in behavior between offer and demand games. Using Selten's (1967) strategy method, we can reveal some of the subjects reasoning principles leading to these differences. Each subject participated in eight periods of the same game against changing anonymous opponent, so we can study also the subjects' learning behavior.
Keywords:
JEL-Classification-Number: 026, 215
Creation-Date: March 1991
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