SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. A-448

Author: Kamecke, Ulrich
Title: Competitive Bidding in an English Multi-object Auction: An Experimental Study
Abstract: In the experiment several objects were auctioned simultaneously. The buyers should always submit the myopically best bid and with these Walrasian strategies the auction would construct the buyer-optimal competitive allocation. The experimental outcomes were very efficient but not as close to the competitive equilibrium as this efficiency measure suggests. The bidding strategies were close to the game theoretic prediction and they were getting better as the experimental sessions proceeded. Nevertheless, some participants persistently deviated from the predicted play, but since their deviations were costly, the evidence supports the claim that most agents should sooner or later adopt the recommended strategies.
Keywords: English auctions, matching markets, experimental economics
JEL-Classification-Number: C78, C92, D44
Creation-Date: June 1994
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