Author:
Konrad, Kai A., and Stergios Skaperdas
Title: Extortion
Abstract: Extortion of productive enterprises ("shops") by organized crime groups
("gangs") takes place in virtually all economies. We examine this activity
and we find that its main harm comes from the long-run erosion and
distortion of useful production it induces and from the wasteful competition
among gangs the presence of extortion rents can bring about. To minimize
this harm then, the ability of community and authorities to commit resources
for the long haul is important. Among other results, we also find: gangs, in
order to recoup tribute losses, may increase their activity in response to
increased police protection; forward-looking gangs tend to induce lower
resource waste than gangs with short time horizons.
Keywords: Extortion, Organized Crime, Law
Enforcement
JEL-Classification-Number: H50, K40, L51
Creation-Date: February 1994
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