
 
Author:  
Konrad, Kai A., and Stergios Skaperdas
Title:  Extortion
Abstract:  Extortion of productive enterprises ("shops") by organized crime groups 
("gangs") takes place in virtually all economies. We examine this activity 
and we find that its main harm comes from the long-run erosion and  
distortion of useful production it induces and from the wasteful competition 
among gangs the presence of extortion rents can bring about. To minimize 
this harm then, the ability of community and authorities to commit resources 
for the long haul is important. Among other results, we also find: gangs, in 
order to recoup tribute losses, may increase their activity in response to 
increased police protection; forward-looking gangs tend to induce lower  
resource waste than gangs with short time horizons.
Keywords:  Extortion, Organized Crime, Law 
Enforcement
JEL-Classification-Number:  H50, K40, L51
Creation-Date:  February 1994
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